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Objectives of the study
 Identifying challenges in managing and implementing GEOSS as a 
public good.
 Examining how these problems are discussed in economic and 
game theoretical literature. 
 Examining problems concerning the user integration of GEOSS. 
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41. Voluntary participation 
• Socially optimal size for an agreement to provide a public good is 
full cooperation. 
• Fraction of members to an agreement decreases with the number of 
affected countries.
• Tradeoff between breadth and depths of an agreement. Agreements 
tend to codify actions which agents were already undertaken
 External institution to induce cooperation   
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52. Asymmetrically distributed Information  
• Asymmetrically distributed information lead to 
adverse selection
moral hazard
• Informational asymmetries can lower  outcome in situations of 
cooperation.
 External monitoring institutions can have a positive effect  on 
information disclosure
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63. Standard setting and the role of a 
technological leader
How can standards emerge in a self-organizing process? 
• Network effects and increased benefits (direct network effects, 
indirect network effects). 
• Agents often delay the private provision to a network.
• Agents fear to be stranded with a technology or standard which no 
one else uses. 
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74. Public-Private Partnerships
 Provision of a public good requires different inputs: possibility for 
partnerships to exploit the comparative advantage in production, and 
relative project valuation.
 Private sector is usually motivated by profits and might give 
insufficient weight to quality or safety issues.
 Both partners will have risks involved.
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8User Integration 
 User integration should not only focus on how the end-users can 
access GEOSS, but also on how users can be integrated in the 
process of designing and implementing GEOSS.
 Strengthen visibility of GEOSS in the general public. 
 Is the GEO Web portal sufficient to address all users? Could the 
integration of social scientists as a bridge between natural scientists 
and users help?
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9Conclusion
 Game theoretic and economic concepts offer explanations for possible trends and
scenarios concerning the provision of a public good.
 The provision of a public good demands an external institution as coordinator. The
GEO secretariat might fulfill this role by providing guidance for the GEOSS
components, establishing a framework for cooperation, and fostering political
approval for the tasks.
 Similarly, optimal standard setting and achieving interoperability can be jeopardized
without guidance of an external institution.
 Asymmetrically distributed information and insufficient communication might be a
major barrier to the establishment of GEOSS. An external institutions could focus
on setting incentives to foster revelation of information and communication.
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